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Just three years ago the United States marked the bicenten-
nial of Marbury v. Madison, the celebrated case that established 
the principle of judicial review in 1803. The novelty of a court as-
serting authority to declare laws unconstitutional was labelled by 
the noted historian Charles Beard as "the most unique contribu-
tion to the science of government which has been made by 
American political genius. "1 The occasion of the anniversary 
prompted a considerable outpouring of scholarly articles on the 
subject of judicial review,2 many of them focusing on the ques-
* LL.B. (Melbourne), Ph.D. (Columbia), James G. McDonald Professor, Emeri-
tus, of American History, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. 
This article had its origin in a paper I delivered at a 2003 conference on Marbury v. 
Madison, sponsored by the University of London's Institute of United States Studies. I 
am grateful to the then-Director of the Institute, Gary L. McDowell, for the opportunity 
afforded me on that occasion for a keen discussion of the Brutus thesis. 
1. CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES 162 (The Macmillan Co. 1956) (1913). In the words of Alexander 
Bickel, thanks to judicial review, "[t]he least dangerous branch of the American govern-
ment is the most extraordinarily powerful court of law the world has ever known." 
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 1 (1962). 
2. Without any attempt to present an exhaustive list of such articles, see, for ex-
ample, Christopher L. Eisgruber, Marbury v. Madison: A Bicentennial Symposium, 89 
VA. L. REV. 1203 (2003); Davison M. Douglas, Judicial Review: Blessing or Curse? Or 
Both? A Symposium in Commemoration of the Bicentennial of Marbury v. Madison, 38 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 375 (2003); Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A 
Plea for New Contexts, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1031 (1997); Theodore B. Olson, Remembering 
Marbury v. Madison, 7 GREEN BAG 35 (2003); Linda Greenhouse, Because We Are Fi-
nal: Judicial Review Two Hundred Years After Marbury, 56 SMU L. REV. 781 (2003); 
Richard A. Fallon, Marbury and the Constitutional Mind: A Bicentennial Essay on the 
Wages of Doctrinal Tension, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1 \2003); Theodore W. Ruger, A Question 
7 
8 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 23:7 
tion whether the Rehnquist Court had not strayed from the gen-
erally accepted parameters of judicial review as recognized by 
the Court since the late nineteen-thirties.3 
It is noteworthy that whenever Marbury v. Madison is dis-
cussed in works on constitutional law, text books or case books, 
reference is invariably made to Alexander Hamilton's discussion 
of judicial review in Federalist No. 78 as an early indication that 
the principle was regarded as a fundamental part of the system 
of government set up under the Constitution.4 Surprisingly, these 
Which Convulses a Nation: The Early Republic's Greatest Debate About the Judicial Re-
view Power, 117 HARV. L. REV. 826 (2004); Symposium, The Rehnquist Court, 99 NW.U. 
L. REV. 1 (2004); Harry F. Tepker, Marbury's Legacy After Two Centuries, 57 OKLA. L. 
REv. 127 (2004); Symposium, Locating the Constitutional Center-Centrist Judges and 
Mainstream Values: A Multidisciplinary Exploration, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1089 (2005); Sym-
posium, Theories of Taking the Constitution Seriously Outside the Courts, 73 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1341 (2005); Robert J. Reinstein, Reconstructing Marbury, 57 ARK. L. REV. 729 
(2005); Sanford Levinson, Why I Do Not Teach Marbury (Except to Eastern Europeans) 
and Why You Shouldn't Either," 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553 (2003); Eric J. Segall, 
Why I Still Teach Marbury (And So Should You): A Response to Professor Levinson, 6 
U. PA. J. CONST. L 573 (2004); Sanford Levinson, Why I Still Won't Teach Marbury (Ex-
cept in a Seminar), id., 588; Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. 
REV. 257 (2005); Richard Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
1787 (2005); Symposium, Marbury at 200: A Bicentennial Celebration of Marbury v. 
Madison, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 1 (2003); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth 
of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2706 (2003). 
3. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards 
of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000); Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS, passim (1999); Ruth Colker and James J. 
Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2003); Steven H. Goldberg, Putting 
the Supreme Court Back in Place: Ideology Yes; Agenda No, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
175 (2004); ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN 
LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE (1996). Judge Bork goes so far as to propose the 
adoption of a constitutional amendment to enable Congress to formally override deci-
sions of the courts. 
Needless to say, various scholars have rallied to the defense of the Court and of the 
institution of judicial review generally. Prominent among them are John C. Yoo, The Ju-
dicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL . L. REV. 1311 (1997); Saikrishna B. Prakash 
and John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 
TEX. L. REV. 1459 (2001); Prakash and Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 887 (2003). See also, in support of the Court's rulings, Lynn A Baker and Ernest 
A Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75 
(2001); Steven A Calabresi, 'A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers': In De-
fense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1995); Randy E. Barnett, The 
Original Meaning of the Judicial Power (Boston University School of Law, Working Pa· 
per No. 03-18, 2004). 
4. According to one authority, "Federalist No. 78 is second only to Marshall's 
Marbury opinion as the classic utterance on the subject" of judicial review. Leonard W. 
Levy, Judicial Review, History, and Democracy: An Introduction, in JUDICIAL REVIEW 
AND THE SUPREME COURT 6 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1967). And in the words of another 
writer, "Hamilton, more than any other single man, is the author of judicial review as the 
nineteenth century was to know it." BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF 
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works, almost without exception, fail to refer to the Antifederal-
ist Letters of Brutus to which this number of the Federalist Pa-
pers constitutes a response.5 This is a regrettable omission since 
No. 78 cannot be properly understood except in the context of 
Brutus' charge that the Constitution provided, not only for judi-
cial review, but for judicial supremacy.6 Federalist No. 78 (and 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 23 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1967) (1942). 
5. In examining some twenty case and text books, I found only one that referred 
to the essays of Brutus: ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON AND WILLIAM M. BEANEY, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS AND SELECTED CASES 
32-35 (6th ed. 1978). In contrast, a classic work on judicial review, CHARLES GROVE 
HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (2d ed. 1932), while it 
analyzes Federalist No. 78 extensively, does not contain a single reference to Brutus in 
the index. The same holds true for SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW 
OF THE CONSTITUTION (1990). Even law reviews, which have a better record than case-
books or textbooks in noting Brutus, generally fail to appreciate the direct significance of 
Brutus' thesis for discussion of the subject of judicial supremacy. (One exception is Pro-
fessor Michael Stokes Paulsen, whose work I discuss presently. See infra note 6.) Con-
trary to the common conception reflected in the various works, No. 78 was not the result 
of some spontaneous inspiration on Hamilton's part to endorse judicial review. 
6. The first to note that Federalist No. 78 was prompted by Brutus' essays on the 
judiciary was Edward S. Corwin, in his celebrated work written during FDR's conflict 
with the Court over the New Deal, EDWARDS. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION: 
A STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT (1938). 
In an appendix, Corwin published three of Brutus' essays on the judiciary (Nos. 11, 12, 
15). In the Preface to the book, he writes: "I would urge the reader to give some atten-
tion to the Appendix, for the 'Letters of Brutus' there given comprise the most thorough 
examination that was made prior to the Constitution's adoption of the power of the Su-
preme Court in interpreting it-an examination, moreover, which inspired Hamilton's 
!lluch better known but less elaborate discussion of the subject in the Federalist." /d. at 
Ill. 
Despite the prominence which Corwin gave to Brutus' essays, there was very little 
sequel. It would appear that, in sum, only two articles focusing on Brutus have appeared 
in the interval that has elapsed since the Corwin work was published. One, the first com-
plete edition of Brutus' essays, accompanied by a 20-page introduction: William Jeffrey 
Jr., The Letters of Brutus: A Neglected Element in the Ratification Campaign of 1787-88, 
40 U. CIN. L. REV. 643-777 (1971). The second was an incisive analysis by Ann Diamond, 
The Anti-Federalist 'Brutus,' 6 POL. SCI. REv. 249--81 (1976). With the publication of 2 
STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981), the text, 
with commentary and notes became readily available to researchers. (All citations to 
Brutus in the present article refer to the Storing edition.) 
Leonard Levy and Gary L. McDowell both advert to the Brutus essays to explain 
the origin of No. 78. Leonard Levy, supra note 4, at 6; Gary L. McDowell, Were the Anti-
Federalists Right? Judicial Activism and the Problem of Consolidated Government, 3 
PUBLIUS 103 (1982). 
Gary Wills, in his EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST chs. 14-15 (1981), 
claims that Hamilton in No. 78 was, in fact, arguing for legislative supremacy rather than 
seeking to confirm the validity of judicial review. This novel interpretation does not ap-
pear to have received wider endorsement. 
Professor Michael Paulsen's work in the past two decades recognizes the significance 
of Brutus' essays in the debate over judicial power at the time of the framing, and their 
role in spurring Hamilton to his rebuttal in The Federalist No. 78. 
See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say 
What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 245-52 (1994) (contending that the primary point of 
10 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 23:7 
succeeding numbers) represent merely the other half of a dia-
logue over the claim that judicial supremacy is inherent under 
the Constitution. Moreover, Brutus' views on judicial supremacy 
constitute a novel thesis which, to date, have not been suffi-
ciently appreciated in the literature.7 Hamilton's counter-
argument (mainly in Federalist Nos. 78 and 81), viewed in the 
light of Brutus' thesis, is seen to obfuscate the issue of judicial 
supremacy and, in effect, leaves Brutus' thesis unimpaired. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND NATIONAL CONSOLIDATION 
Perhaps the first thing to note is that Brutus did not ques-
tion the right of the courts to exercise judicial review. 
[I]f the legislature pass laws, which, in the judgment of the 
court, they are not authorised to do by the constitution, the 
court will not take notice of them; for it will not be denied, 
that the constitution is the highest or supreme law. And the 
courts are vested with the supreme and uncontroulable 
power, to determine, in all cases that come before them, what 
the constitution means; they cannot, therefore, execute a law, 
which, in their judgment, opposes the constitution, unless we 
can suppose they can make a superior law give way to an infe-
• 8 
nor. 
In acknowledging that judicial review was within the prov-
ince of the court, Brutus went on to outline the corollary: "[T]he 
judgment of the judicial, on the constitution, will become the 
rule to guide the legislature in their construction of their powers 
Hamilton's argument for judicial review in The Federalist No. 78 is to refute Brutus' 
charge of judicial supremacy); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Nixon Now: The Courts and the 
Presidency after Twenty-five Years, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1337, 1353-58 (1999) (arguing that 
judicial supremacy is contrary to all evidence of original public meaning and citing 
Brutus' argument as one that the framers, including Hamilton, were fully aware of and 
anxious to repudiate). 
7. The identity of Brutus remains a mystery to this day. Most authorities incline to 
the view that he was Robert Yates, a judge on the New York Supreme Court, who was 
one of three delegates from New York to the 1787 Constitutional Convention. He and 
his fellow-delegate, John Lansing, left the Convention after less than a month, on the 
grounds that it was exceeding its authority in drafting a new constitution. Their departure 
deprived New York of a vote, since the third delegate, Alexander Hamilton, was left 
without a quorum. For discussion of the identity of Brutus, see Jeffrey, supra note 6, at 
644-46, Diamond, supra note 6, at 252-53, 2 STORING, supra note 6, at 2:358. Corwin as-
sumes, without discussion, that Yates was the author of the Brutus .essays. Cecelia M. 
Kenyon makes the same assumption. "The Anti-Federalists," she says, "had no publicist 
more able than Robert Yates." CECELIA M. KENYON, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS 323 
(1966). 
8. 2 STORING, supra note 6, at 2.9.148. 
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[since] the legislature ... will not go over the limits by which the 
courts may adjudge they are confined."9 
What concerned Brutus, in the first instance, was the use to 
which the court would apply judicial review in the service of na-
tional consolidation and how this would threaten the independ-
ence and survival of the states. The judicial power, Brutus 
warned, would operate to affirm and legitimate all the invasions 
of state power committed by the national legislature. "The real 
effect of this system of government, will ... be brought home to 
the feelings of the people, through the medium of the judicial 
power." Therefore, he said, it was 
of great importance, to examine with care the nature and ex-
tent of the judicial power, because those who are to be vested 
with it, are to be placed in a situation altogether unprece-
dented in a free country. They are to be rendered totally in-
dependent, both of the people and the legislature. 10 
"Every extension of the power of the general legislature, as 
well as of the judicial powers, will increase the powers of the 
courts; and the dignity and importance of the judges, will be in 
proportion to the extent and magnitude of the powers they exer-
cise."u Thus, "the judicial power will operate to effect, in the 
most certain, but yet silent and imperceptible, manner what is 
evidently the tendency of the constitution: -I mean, an entire 
subversion of the legislative, executive and judicial powers of the 
individual states."12 By legitimating the expansive exercise of 
federal power, the courts would be contributing to the aggran-
dizement of the national government at the expense of the 
states. And the institution of a federal system of government, 
which presumed a meaningful role for the states in partnership 
with the national government, would be seen as a mere sham. 
"The opinions of the supreme court, whatever they may be, will 
have the force of law; because there is no power provided in the 
constitution, that can correct their errors, or controul their adju-
dications. From this court there is no appeal. "13 And presumably, 
the legislature itself could not set aside a judgment of this court, 
he said, "because they are authorized by the constitution to de-
cide in the last resort. The legislature must be controuled by the 
9. !d. at 2.9.148-49. 
10. !d. at 2.9.130. 
11. !d. at 2.9.142. 
12. !d. at 2.9.139. 
13. !d. at 2.9.138. 
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constitution, and not the constitution by them." 14 Given the 
power of the judiciary, it "will enable them to mould the gov-
ernment, into almost any shape they please. "15 
It was important, in Brutus' view, to appreciate that the 
court would be free to interpret the constitution, "not only ac-
cording to its letter, but according to its spirit and intention; and 
having this power, they would strongly incline to give it such a 
construction as to extend the powers of the general government, 
as much as possible, to the diminution, and finally to the destruc-
tion, of that of the respective states."16 
The "spirit" of the constitution, Brutus claimed, can best be 
deduced from the preamble to the Constitution, which included 
the comprehensive term "to provide for the general welfare." 
"[I]f the spirit of this system is to be known from its declared end 
and design in the preamble, its spirit is to subvert and abolish all 
the powers of the state government, and to embrace every object 
to which any government extends." 17 This conclusion is con-
firmed by the powers enumerated in Article 1, Section 8, which 
"extend to almost every thing about which any legislative power 
can be employed. "18 And if so, Brutus contended, "nothing can 
stand before it" (i.e., the national legislature ). 19 This was particu-
larly so in view of the expansive nature of the necessary and 
proper clause which would "undoubtedly be an excellent auxil-
liary to assist the courts to discover the spirit and reason of the 
constitution. "20 As a result, the powers of the government would 
extend "to every case, and reduce the state legislatures to noth-
ing. "21 This conclusion emerged from the following analysis: 
[T]hese courts will have authority to decide upon the validity 
of the laws of any of the states, in all cases where they come in 
question before them. Where the constitution gives the gen-
eral government exclusive jurisdiction, they will adjudge all 
laws made by the states, in such cases, void ab initio. Where 
the constitution gives them concurrent jurisdiction, the laws of 
the United States must prevail, because they are the supreme 
law. In such cases, therefore, the laws of the state legislatures 
must be repealed, restricted, or so construed, as to give full ef-
14. /d. 
15. Id. at 2.9.144. 
16. /d. at 2.9.145. 
17. /d. at 2.9 .151. 
18. /d. at 2.9 .152. 
19. /d. 
20. /d. at 2.9.153 
21. /d. at 2.9.154. 
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feet to the laws of the union on the same subject. ... [I]n pro-
portion as the general government acquires power and juris-
diction, by the liberal construction which the judges may give 
the constitution, will those of the states lose its rights, until 
they become so trifling and unimportant, as not to be worth 
h 0 22 avmg. 
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 
13 
Beyond assessing the impact of judicial review on the states, 
Brutus proceeded to analyze its effect on the national sphere as 
well. Here he enunciated in very trenchant-indeed, pre-
scient23 -comments the reason why the Supreme Court would 
come to exercise, not only judicial review, but judicial suprem-
acy. 
The fundamental principle of ordered government, accord-
ing to Brutus, is accountability. While separation of powers was 
an essential requirement of sound government, accountability, 
he insisted, was no less essential an ingredient. 
To have a government well administered in all its parts, it is 
requisite the different departments of it should be separated 
and lodged as much as may be in different hands. The legisla-
tive power should be in one body, the executive in another, 
and the judicial in one different from either-But still each of 
these bodies should be accountable for their conduct. 24 ••• 
When great and extraordinary powers are vested in any 
man, or body of men, which in their exercise, may operate to 
the oppression of the people, it is of high importance that 
powerful checks should be formed to prevent the abuse of 
it. . . . [T]he true policy of a republican government is, to 
frame it in such manner, that all persons who are concerned in 
the government, are made accountable to some superior for 
22. !d. at 2.9.158. 
23. In his introductory essay, What the Anti-Federalists Were For, in THE 
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, Herbert Storing writes: "The most farsighted of them, 
Brutus, very accurately anticipated the breadth with which the Supreme Court would 
construe its own powers and those of the general legislature and the line of reasoning 
that would be used." 1 STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 50 (Herbert J. Stor-
ing ed., 1981). Similarly, Ann Diamond comments: "In the papers on the judiciary ... 
Brutus foresees with great accuracy, this history [of the Court], a feat unique to him." 
Diamond, supra note 6, at 255. 
24. 2 STORING, supra note 6, at 2.9.197. For further comment by Brutus on the prin-
ciple of the separation of powers, see id. at 2.9.203. 
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their conduct in office. -This responsibility should ultimately 
rest with the People.25 
With regard to the legislature, Brutus explained, the elected 
representatives are chosen by the people at stated periods, and 
are therefore amenable to popular control. Inferior courts are 
subject to the control of superior courts. "But on this plan we at 
last arrive at some supreme, over whom there is no power to 
controul but the people themselves. "26 The creation of an institu-
tion, which is not accountable at all to any outside body, "is re-
pugnant to the principles of a free government," Brutus 
warned.27 "The supreme court under this constitution would be 
exalted above all other power in the government, and subject to 
no controul. 28 ••• I question whether the world ever saw, in any 
period of it, a court of justice invested with such immense pow-
ers, and yet placed in a situation so little responsible." 29 
In his search for what might have been a suitable means of 
instituting accountability for the Supreme Court, Brutus refers 
to the precedent of the British judiciary. 
The judges in England are under the controul of the leigisla-
ture, for they are bound to determine according to the laws 
passed by them. But the judges under this constitution will 
controul the legislature, for the supreme court are authorised 
in the last resort, to determine what is the extent of the pow-
ers of the Congress; they are to give the constitution an ex-
planation, and there is no power above them to set aside their 
. d 30 JU gment. 
If the Framers of the Constitution followed the British 
precedent of making the judges independent, they should have 
also followed the British constitution "in instituting a tribunal in 
which their errors may be corrected."31 In Britain, the judiciary 
was subject to appeals to the House of Lords by means of a writ 
of error, and the final disposition of a case was decided by the 
vote of all the Lords, lay peers no less than judicial.32 In this 
25. !d. at 2.9.197. 
26. !d. 
27. !d. 
28. !d. at 2.9.186. 
29. ld. 
30. !d. at 2.9.188. 
31. !d. 
32. See generally, ROBERT STEVENS, LAW AND POLITICS: THE HOUSE OF LORDS 
AS A JUDICIAL BODY,1800-1976, at 6-14 (1978); THE OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 585 
(David M. Walker ed., 1980); Thomas Beven, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of 
Lords, 17 L. Q. REV. 357,365-69 (1901). 
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comment, Brutus was referring to the fact that the judges under 
the British system were not only bound by the laws of Parlia-
ment, but did not operate as the court of last resort. In contrast, 
under the Constitution, "the judicial ... have a power which is 
above the legislative, and which indeed transcends any power 
before given to a judicial by any free government under 
heaven."33 In England, judges had to be made completely inde-
pendent so as to be undeterred from rendering judgment even 
contrary to the wishes of the Crown. There was no such necessity 
in the United States and the absolute independence of judges, 
without any accountability to any other body, was quite unwar-
ranted. Brutus went on to point out another crucial distinction 
between the British and American systems of government-the 
ability of Parliament to severely restrict the broader impact of an 
unwarranted and inappropriate judicial interpretation of the 
constitution-a power entirely lacking to the U.S. Congress. 
The supreme court then have a right, independent of the leg-
islature, to give a construction to the constitution and every 
part of it, and there is no power provided in this system to 
correct their construction or do it away. If, therefore, the leg-
islature pass any laws, inconsistent with the sense the judges 
put upon the constitution, they will declare it void; and there-
fore in this respect their power is superior to that of the legis-
lature. In England the judges are not only subject to have 
their decisions set aside by the house of lords, for error, but in 
cases where they give an explanation to the laws or constitu-
tion of the country, contrary to the sense of the parliament, 
though the parliament will not set aside the judgment of the 
court, yet, they have authority, by a new law, to explain a 
former one, and by this means to prevent a reception of such 
decisions. But no such power is in the [U.S.] legislature. The 
judges are supreme-and no law, explanatory of the constitu-
tion, will be binding on them.34 
The end result was that, 
(t]here is no power above them to controul any of their deci-
sions. There is no authority that can remove them, and they 
cannot be controuled by the laws of the legislature. In short, 
they are independent of the people, of the legislature, and of 
every power under heaven. Men placed in this situation will 
generally soon feel themselves independent of heaven itsele5 
33. 2 STORING, supra note 6, at 2.9.188. 
34. !d. at 2.9.193 
35. !d. at 2.9.189. Brutus acknowledged that the election of judges would be "im-
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Brutus dismissed the possibility that impeachment could 
serve as a factor to restrain the judiciary. Errors in judgment are 
not included under the heading of "high crimes and misdemean-
ors," he explained.36 Likewise, he was not prepared to put his 
faith in the power of Congress under Article 3 of the Constitu-
tion to define the scope of the Court's appellate jurisdiction 
"with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations" as it may 
prescribe. To assume that Congress would "make provision 
against all the evils which are apprehended from this article" was 
to adopt faulty reasoning. 37 
[T[his way of answering the objection made to the power, im-
plies an admission that the power is in itself improper without 
restraint, and if so, why not restrict it in the first instance .... 
For to answer objections made to a power given to a govern-
ment, by saying it will never be exercised, is really admitting 
that the power ou~ht not to be exercised, and therefore ought 
not to be granted. 
This court, he reminded his readers, "will be authorized to 
decide upon the meaning of the constitution," on the basis of the 
natural meaning of the words and "also according to the spirit 
and intention" thereof, as conceived by the judges.39 "In the ex-
ercise of this power they will not be subordinate to, but above 
the legislature. "40 His conclusion was that "when this power [of 
deciding the meaning of the Constitution] is lodged in the hands 
of men independent of the people, and of their representatives, 
and who are not, constitutionally, accountable for their opinions, 
no way is left to controul them but with a high hand and an out-
stretched arm. "41 
In sum, what Brutus was enunciating was an entirely origi-
nal explanation for judicial review, which, he claimed, would 
proper." ld. 
36. ld. at 2.9.192. 
37. !d. at 2.9.185. 
38. ld. See also, Brutus' comment on this provision in relation to the question of 
jury trial, id. at 2.9.176. 
39. !d. at 2.9.193. 
40. ld. 
41. ld. at 2.9.196 (emphasis in original). At root, of course, Brutus was saying that 
judicial supremacy was not in accordance with democratic principles, but democracy, as 
such, did not really concern him. What did concern him was the operation of a body en-
dowed with unbridled power, free to reign and dominate, because it was totally unac-
countable to any other body, whether it be the electorate or their elected representatives. 
On the underlying incompatibility of judicial review with democracy, see BICKEL, supra 
note 1, at 18 ("Nothing ... can alter the essential reality that judicial review is a deviant 
institution in the American democracy."). 
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lead inexorably to judicial supremacy. The essence of republican 
government, he contended, was accountability. In drafting the 
Constitution, the Framers had been remarkably successful in in-
stituting a system of checks and balances so that no single part of 
the national government was free of accountability; there is, 
however, one exception, the Supreme Court. The Justices were 
not answerable to any body at all. They were at liberty to inter-
pret the Constitution in any way they saw fit, and no part of the 
government could qualify or reject their interpretation. Since 
they would have the last word, it was their interpretation that 
would remain binding on all other sectors of the federal govern-
ment.42 
Various theses have been offered to explain the basis of ju-
dicial review.43 The first was that of Chief Justice Marshall who 
found it in the terms of the Constitution itself. The Supremacy 
Clause in Article 6 of the Constitution stipulated that only those 
laws which were made "pursuant" to the Constitution were 
valid.44 Others, in rejecting the textual basis of judicial review, 
found that it was a necessity because of the need for some insti-
tution to umpire the federal system.45 Still others deemed judicial 
review an essential appurtenance of a written constitution.46 
Both of the latter theses would require the court to be quite re-
strictive in the exercise of judicial review. And there were yet 
others, such as Judge Learned Hand, who claimed that judicial 
review had no legal basis whatsoever under the Constitution. It 
was req~ired only to prevent the "collapse" of the constitutional 
system. 
Brutus' argument is not that the text of the Constitution 
mandates judicial review, or even authorizes it, but that the struc-
ture of the Constitution allows for judicial supremacy. Since 
42. It was Justice Robert Jackson who coined the immortal aphorism: "We are not 
final because we are infallible, but we arc infallible only because we are final." Brown v. 
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). In similar fashion, Chief Justice 
Harlan Fiske Stone wrote: "While unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive 
and legislative branches is subject to judicial restraint, the only check upon our own exer-
cise of power is our own sense of self-restraint." U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78-79 (1936) 
(Stone, J., dissenting). 
43. For a review of the various theories, see WALTER F. MURPHY, JAMES E. 
FLEMING & WILLIAM F. HARRIS II, AMERICAN CO~STITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
186-89 (1986). 
44. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
45. For discussion of this thesis see BICKEL, supra note I, at ch. 1. 
46. See Murphy et al., supra note 43, at 187-188. 
47. For discussion of the novel view of Judge Learned Hand, presented during his 
delivery of the 1958 Holmes Lectures at Harvard University, see the outstanding biogra-
phy by GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MA~ AND THE 1l:DGE 652-59 (1994). 
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there would be nothing to stop the court from declaring that a 
law was unconstitutional, it could, with impunity, proceed to do 
just that. The court, as it were, would be exercising constitutional 
jurisdiction by default. It was a failing of the architects of the 
Constitution that they had created a body, such as the Supreme 
Court, entirely free of any accountability. Judicial supremacy 
was not dictated by the Constitution, it was permitted under the 
Constitution because there was no power that could prevent the 
institution with the last say, the Supreme Court, from telling the 
other branches of government what they were allowed, or not 
allowed, to do. In short, Brutus contended, judicial supremacy 
was a direct consequence of the failure of the Framers to insti-
tute some sort of checks and balances on the Supreme Court as 
had been instituted on all other parts of the federal government. 
Brutus' charge was clearly a severe remonstrance against 
the Framers of the Constitution and demanded a detailed an-
swer if it was not to serve as a rallying point against ratification 
of the Constitution. If it was unduly alarmist, there was need to 
demonstrate, or at least to give the appearance of demonstrat-
ing, that the fears expressed were exaggerated and unwarranted. 
This was Hamilton's aim in Federalist No. 78 and the other 
numbers that followed. 
HAMILTON'S RESPONSE: JUDICIAL REVIEW 
AFFIRMED 
With reference to Federalist No. 78, it is important to note 
that it presents an answer to the question of how to react to fed-
eral aggrandizement of power that is very different from the one 
provided by Hamilton to the same question earlier in the Feder-
alist Papers.48 In Federalist No. 33 he had written: 
If the Federal Government should overpass the just bounds of 
its authority, and make tyrannical use of its powers; the peo-
ple whose creature it is must appeal to the standard they have 
formed, and take such measures to redress the injury done to 
the constitution, as the exigency may suggest and prudence 
justify .... 
[A]cts of the larger society which are not pursuant to its 
constitutional powers but which are invasions of the residuary 
48. See CORWIN, supra note 6, at 45. 
2006] BRUTUS' NEGLECTED THESIS 
authorities of the smaller societies ... will be merely acts of 
usurpation and will deserve to be treated as such.49 
19 
There is not a word here about judicial review or the role of 
the courts in striking down legislative acts violating the bounds 
of national authority. Redress lies with the people alone. Only 
after Brutus published his thesis on judicial supremacy did Ham-
ilton proceed to advertise his view that judicial review could 
serve as a means of forestalling national encroachment on state 
authority.50 In effect, Hamilton seized on Brutus' argument and, 
while denying the cataclysmic consequences Brutus predicted, 
adapted the argument to highlight the role of the court as a 
complete answer to the danger of national aggrandizement. 51 
In Federalist Nos. 78 and 81, Hamilton sought to provide a 
point-by-point rejoinder to Brutus' charges. 
1. The Virtue Of Appointing Judges To Serve "During 
Good Behaviour. " 
To Hamilton, the Antifederalists' criticism of this term of 
office for judges was but a "symptom of the rage for objection 
which disorders their imaginations and judgments. "52 This term 
of office for members of the judiciary represented, in fact, "one 
of the most valuable of the modern improvements in the practice 
of government."53 If in a monarchy it was "an excellent barrier to 
the despotism of the prince; in a republic it [was] a no less excel-
lent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the repre-
sentative body. "54 Hamilton sought to allay the fears of an activ-
ist judiciary. In a government composed of "different 
departments of power, ... the judiciary, from the nature of its 
functions, will always be the least dangerous [branch] to the po-
litical rights of the Constitution."55 While the executive "holds 
49. THE FEDERALIST No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
50. See CORWIN, supra note 6, at 45-46. 
51. In the words of Leonard Levy, Federalist No. 78 "was an attempt to quiet the 
fears stimulated by Yates (Brutus]; turning the latter's argument against him." Levy, su-
pra note 4, at 6. And according to William Jeffrey, "Alexander Hamilton, ... was far in-
deed from uttering freshly-minted and indubitable truths about the power of the Su-
preme Court to declare the invalidity of congressional statutes. Compelled by the 
Constitution's text to acknowledge judicial review, Hamilton was unable to do more than 
repeat the assertions of 'Brutus' and attempt to minimize their alarmist impact and dis-
miss their argumentative force." Jeffrey, supra note 6, at 655. 
52. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
53. !d. 
54. !d. 
55. !d. 
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the sword of the community," and the legislature "commands 
the purse," the judiciary has "no influence" over either the 
sword or purse, and "can take no active resolution whatever."56 
Having "neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment," it 
was dependent on "the aid of the executive arm even for the ef-
ficacy of its judgments."57 "Permanency in office," said Hamil-
ton, is vital to its "firmness and independence," to enable it to 
pronounce "all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Consti-
tution void."58 Under a limited constitution, where certain ac-
tions are proscribed, if the court were not to have this power "all 
the reservations of particular rights or privileges [enumerated] 
would amount to nothing. "59 
Of course, Brutus had stated that he could not conceive of 
any alternative to judges serving for life. "I do not object to the 
judges holding their commissions during good behaviour. I sup-
pose it a proper provision provided they were made properly re-
sponsible. "60 However, granting the judges the power, as Hamil-
ton would have it, to pronounce acts contrary to the "manifest 
tenor" of the Constitution void, was to grant them supremacy. 
No greater power exists in one person over another than the au-
thority to make the second person's act null and void, so that the 
will of the first predominates. This absolute veto power in the 
judiciary imparted unlimited dominance over the other two 
branches, and Hamilton's references to the power of the purse 
or the sword were mere platitudes, since of what use are these 
"active" powers if they cannot be exercised except with the con-
sent of the Court? Absent restrictions on the judges' unbridled 
freedom of action, there was no reason why they should not dic-
tate to, and completely dominate, the other branches of govern-
ment. To this, Hamilton took exception. 
2. Judicial Review Does Not Mean Judicial Supremacy. 
Declaring the acts of another branch of government void, 
said Hamilton, does not mean that the one making the pro-
nouncement is necessarily supreme. It does not suppose "a supe-
riority of the judicial to the legislative power. "61 Since a constitu-
tion emanating from the people "is, in fact, and must be 
56. !d. 
57. !d. 
58. !d. 
59. !d. 
60. 2 STORING, supra note 6, at 2.9.189. 
61. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law" if there is "an ir-
reconcileable variance" between the act of the legislature and 
the constitution, the judges have no choice but to prefer the con-
stitution to the statute, "the intention of the people to the inten-
tion of their agents. "62 
This argument was mere casuistry on Hamilton's part, for 
several reasons. For one thing, what makes the judges more 
faithfully representative of the people than the elected "agents" 
of the people? If the latter consider their action to be consistent 
with the Constitution, from whence do the judges derive supe-
rior title to be "acting on behalf of the people" and declare it in-
consistent? Indeed, the legislative "agents" are accountable to 
the people for their decisions, while the judges are not. So why 
should one assume that the determination of the judges is more 
authoritative and faithful to "the intention of the people" than 
that of their elected representatives?63 Above all, what would 
prevent the judges from asserting that there was a contradiction 
between a statute and the Constitution, when on the face of the 
statute no such contradiction was apparent? Moreover, granting 
the judges the last word was subversive of the basic principle of 
republican government since it removes from the people, the ul-
timate judges, the right and the power to react and to rectify 
what they regard as a misreading of the constitution. 
All of this had appeared in the final paragraph of Brutus' 
essay No. 15 dealing with the judiciary.64 
Had the construction of the constitution been left with the 
legislature, they would have explained it at their peril; if they 
exceed their powers, or sought to find, in the spirit of the con-
stitution, more than was expressed in the letter, the people 
from whom they derived their power could remove them, and 
do themselves right; ... A constitution is a compact of a peo-
ple with their rulers; if the rulers break the compact, the peo-
ple have a right and ought to remove them and do themselves 
justice; but in order to enable them to do this with the greater 
facility, those whom the people chuse at stated periods, 
should have the power in the last resort to determine the 
sense of the compact; if they determine contrary to the under-
standing of the people, an appeal will lie to the people at the 
62. !d. 
63. Bickel also presents a similar line of argument. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 4--5. 
And in the words of Ann Diamond, "Hamilton paints a picture of a court which is not 
only compatible with a representative democracy, but the essence of it; a court more de-
mocratic than the elected representatives of the people." Diamond, supra note 6, at 278. 
64. 2 STORING, supra note 6, at 2.9.196. 
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period when the rulers are to be elected, and they will have it 
in their power to remedy the evil; but when this power is 
lodged in the hands of men independent of the people, and of 
their representatives, and who are not, constitutionally, ac-
countable for their opinions, no way is left to controul them 
but with a high hand and an outstretched arm. 65 
Furthermore, according to Brutus, it was vain to claim that 
declaring the acts of Congress void did not signify judicial supe-
riority; in fact, that organ of government qualified to pronounce 
the last word exercises dominance. "[T]he judges under this con-
stitution will controul the legislature, for the supreme court are 
authorised in the last resort, to determine what is the extent of 
the powers of Congress; they are to give the constitution an ex-
planation, and there is no power above them to set aside their 
judgment. "66 In reaction to this, Hamilton declares: "It can be of 
no weight to say that the courts, on the pretence of a repug-
nancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional in-
tentions of the legislature .... The courts must declare the sense 
of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL in-
stead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the 
substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body."67 
This, he says, would only go to show that there should be no 
judges "distinct" from the legislature.68 Hamilton himself, how-
ever, offers no suggestion on how to forestall judges exercising 
WILL instead of JUDGMENT. 
3 . Judicial Review as a Shield. 
Hamilton sought to demonstrate that judicial review would 
serve to protect two exposed groups. The courts, he said, would 
operate "as the bulwarks of a limited constitution against legisla-
tive encroachments."69 Hamilton attempted thereby to reassure 
the states that the federal judiciary, far from being a threat to 
their sovereignty, as Brutus would have it, would act as their 
guardian in striking down every national attempt to encroach on 
state prerogatives. A second exposed group was that of minori-
ties, and here, once again, the exercise of judicial review would 
operate to protect "the rights of individuals from the effects of 
those ill humours, which the arts of designing men, or the influ-
65. /d. (emphasis in original). 
66. !d. at 2.9.188. 
67. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
68. /d. 
69. /d. 
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ence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among 
the people themselves, and which, ... occasion dangerous inno-
vations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor 
party in the community."70 
Judicial independence was vital if the courts were to act 
against the legislative will in defending the rights of the states 
and of individuals. "It would require an uncommon portion of 
fortitude in the judges to do their duty as faithful guardians of 
the constitution, where legislative invasions of it had been insti-
gated by the major voice of the community."71 Judicial inde-
pendence required permanency of appointment. "Inflexible and 
uniform adherence to the rights of the [states under the] Consti-
tution and of individuals" could not be expected "from judges 
who hold their offices by a temporary commission."72 
But, of course, Brutus had all along acknowledged that ap-
pointment during good behaviour was essential if judges were to 
enjoy that security and independence that would enable them to 
judge fairly and without fear of recrimination. This was not at is-
sue. By raising the matter of tenure of office, Hamilton was rais-
ing a straw man to knock down and score points. Permanency in 
office did not preclude the judges from dominating the legisla-
ture or executive and dictating to these branches of government 
which policies could stand and which could not. Judicial inde-
pendence, Brutus maintained, was vital, but it did not entail the 
right of judicial domination. The distinction between judicial re-
view and judicial supremacy was clear. While the former al-
lowed, and even required, that the court strike down any law 
that was manifestly contrary to the express provisions of the 
Constitution, it did not empower the court to assert the unconsti-
tutionality of a law on the basis of a narrow and particularly sub-
tle interpretation of the relevant constitutional provision. As 
Corwin has said: 
It is fairly evident that the Philadelphia Convention intended 
to provide ... a method for enforcing the direct prohibitions 
of the Constitution on Congress; but by the same token, there 
was originally a clear logical implication against judicial re-
view of broader range. 73 
70. /d. 
71. /d. 
72. /d. 
73. CORWIN, supra note 6, at 81. And Corwin adds: "In Marbury v. Madison unlim-
ited judicial review was clearly asserted." !d. This, of course, was the great novelty of 
Marbury v. Madison-that the Court was competent to rule on matters of interpretation, 
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In effect, Hamilton took Brutus' charge that the exercise of 
judicial review by the Supreme Court would inevitably lead to 
the emasculation of the states and the consolidation of the coun-
try under one central government and cited judicial review as the 
best guarantee against national encroachment on state authority. 
He skillfully turned the tables on Brutus by brandishing judicial 
review as a foil against national aggrandizement, while conven-
iently forgetting that it could also serve to strike down state in-
trusions on national sovereignty. Only in Federalist No. 80 did 
he advert to this power over state legislation, but illustrated it 
solely with reference to such clear-cut prohibitions as the imposi-
tion of duties on imported articles and the issuance of paper 
money. Of necessity, he said, the federal courts would have to be 
empowered "to over-rule such as might be in manifest contra-
vention of the articles of union. "74 Implicitly, Hamilton was sug-
gesting that anything less than a "manifest contravention" of the 
Constitution would not encounter judicial disallowance. (The 
latter role would, of course, be precisely the nemesis of state au-
thority to which Brutus referred.) At the same time, Hamilton 
sidestepped the central charge of Brutus that the Constitution, 
by allowing the judges to interpret the Constitution according to 
its "spirit," effectively conferred on them absolute sovereignty to 
tell the other branches of the national government what the 
Constitution permitted and what it did not. In No. 78, Hamilton 
simply declared that no one could suspect that the courts would 
attempt to impose their will on the co-ordinate branches of gov-
ernment, but did not explain why they would not. That analysis 
he left for No. 81. 
4. Judicial Supremacy Denied. 
Hamilton opened his discussion with a long extract, a sort of 
precis, of the Antifederalist argument-i.e., that of Brutus: 
The authority of the proposed supreme court of the United 
States, which is to be a separate and independent body, will 
be superior to that of the legislature. The power of construing 
the laws according to the spirit of the constitution, will enable 
that court to mould them into whatever shape it may think 
whether in statutes or constitutional provisions, and not merely on explicit Congressional 
violations of the Constitution. As expressed by Bickel: "Marshall knew (and, indeed, it 
was true in this very case) that a statute's repugnancy to the Constitution is in most in-
stances not self-evident; it is, rather, an issue of policy that someone must decide. The 
problem is who." BICKEL, supra note 1, at 3. 
74. THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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proper; especially as its decisions will not be in any manner 
subject to the revision or correction of the legislative body. 
This is as unprecedented as it is dangerous. In Britain, the ju-
dicial power, in the last resort, resides in the house of lords, 
which is a branch of the legislature; and this part of the British 
government has been imitated in the State constitutions in 
general. The parliament of Great-Britain, and the legislatures 
of the several States, can at any time rectify, by law, the ex-
ceptionable decisions of their respective courts. But the errors 
and usurpations of the supreme court of the United States will 
be uncontrolable and remediless.75 
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In dismissing this conclusion, Hamilton asserted that the argu-
ment "will be found to be altogether made up of false reasoning 
upon misconceived fact."76 
5. Judicial Review Limited to Explicit Violations. 
"In the first place," said Hamilton, "there is not a syllable in 
the plan under consideration, which directly empowers the na-
tional courts to construe the laws according to the spirit of the 
constitution, or which gives them any greater latitude in this re-
spect than may be claimed by the courts of every state. "77 Of 
course, Brutus had never said that the Constitution explicitly au-
thorizes the judges to interpret the Constitution according to its 
spirit. It was sufficient that this power was nowhere denied. 
6. Unsuitability of Judiciary as Part of Legislature. 
Perhaps, said Hamilton, the Antifederalist complaint is di-
rected to the fact that the Supreme Court was constituted as a 
separate body rather than "being one of the branches of the leg-
islature, as in the government of Great Britain and that of the 
State [of New York]."78 In Britain, of course, members of the 
House of Lords, lay peers no less than law lords, were empow-
ered to rule on an appeal from a lower court and to void the de-
cision. And Article 32 of the 1777 New York constitution pro-
vided for appeals "for correction of errors" to be heard by a 
75. !d. This precis, drawn from the very words of Brutus, make it absolutely clear 
that Publius Nos. 78-81 were composed as a response to Brutus' essays on the judiciary. 
In light of this fact, the comment in Benjamin Wright's 1942 study, THE GROWTH OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, supra note 4 at 22, that it was "probably" in answer 
to Brutus' argument, seems out of place. 
76. THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
77. ld. 
78. !d. 
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court composed of "the president of the senate, ... the senators, 
chancellor, and judges of the supreme court, or the major part of 
them," but denying the judges "a voice for ... affirmance or re-
versal" of their earlier decision. Here Hamilton was finally ad-
dressing Brutus' primary complaint, that the national judiciary 
was totally free of accountability, in contrast to the way appeals 
were handled in Great Britain, for instance. The case of New 
York had not been mentioned by Brutus, but anyone familiar 
with the status of the judiciary there was undoubtedly aware that 
it paralleled the British example in conferring on the legisla-
ture-or on part of it-supervisory authority over the judiciary. 
In both instances, while the judges were free to express their 
views in matters of appeal, the final decision did not rest with the 
judges alone, but with the representatives of the people who 
were ultimately accountable to the electorate.79 
In response, Hamilton argued that locating the judiciary 
within the legislature would come close to violating, at least par-
tially, the separation of powers principle that was regarded by 
the Antifederalists as sacrosanct. It would also place the judici-
ary in a body marked by faction and politics, a most unsuitable 
setting for judicial determination. Moreover, it was even a 
"greater absurdity" to suggest that men "deficient" in knowledge 
of the law should be allowed to revise decisions reached by men 
expert in the law. All these considerations, said Hamilton, un-
doubtedly influenced most of the other states, other than New 
York, to commit the judicial power not to a part of their legisla-
tures, but to a distinct and separate body.80 And in any case, the 
79. Id. It might sound incongruous today to hear that an appeal could be carried 
from the state's highest court to a non-judicial body. But New York was not alone in 
making provision for such appeals. New Jersey and Connecticut also provided for writs 
of error from the highest court in the state to non-judicial bodies. And, of course, the 
U.S. Senate serves as a tribunal to judge charges of impeachment. In Britain, thanks to 
parliamentary sovereignty, Parliament is, even today, free to nullify or revise judicial in-
terpretations of the British constitution or of a statute. This, of course, is different from 
reversing the decision in a given case, but in terms of revising the legal principle involved, 
it is the same. 
It is also important to recognize that this issue is quite distinct from the question that 
arose in Hayburn's Case. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408,409 (1792). In that case, it will be recalled, 
the justices of the Supreme Court refused to serve as commissioners to assess pension 
claims by veterans since the Secretary of War would have the final say in ruling on the 
application. This arrangement, the justices argued, confirmed that their ruling would be 
an administrative, rather than a judicial one. For discussion of Hayburn's Case, see S. 
SLONIM, FRAMERS' CONSTRUCfiON/BEARDIAN DECONSTRUCf!ON: ESSAYS ON THE 
CONSTITUTIO:-IAL DESIGN OF 1787 at 157--61 (2001). 
80. See generally, History of the Supreme Court of Judicature, 1691-1847, in 
"DUELY & COl'STANTLY KEPT": A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK SUPREME COURT, 
1691-1847, at 2-10 (1991). 
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national legislature will be as free as the legislatures of these 
states to enact fresh laws to modify the decision of the court in 
future cases. Needless to say, none of these answers effectively 
dealt with Brutus' fundamental complaint that the authors of the 
Constitution had unwittingly created an institution which, in 
contrast to all other institutions under the Constitution, was to-
tally free of checks and balances-and free, that is, of the basic 
requirement of any ordered system of government: accountabil-
ity. 
7. The Threat of Impeachment. 
Finally, Hamilton contended, "the supposed danger of judi-
ciary encroachments on the legislative authority, which has been 
upon many occasions reiterated, is in reality a phantom. "81 Occa-
sional "misconstructions and contraventions of the will of the 
legislature may now and then happen," but these would not be 
serious or drastically "affect the order of the political system."82 
This could be inferred, Hamilton said, "from the general nature 
of the judicial power; from the objects to which it relates; from 
the manner in which it is exercised; from its comparative weak-
ness, and from its total incapacity to support its usurpations by 
force."83 And such an inference is "greatly fortified" by the "im-
portant constitutional check," which Congress could institute 
against the judges through impeachment.84 
This is alone a complete security. There never can be danger 
that the judges, by a series of deliberate usurpations on the 
authority of the legislature, would hazard the united resent-
ment of the body entrusted with it, while this body was pos-
sessed of the means of punishin? their presumption, by de-
grading them from their stations. 8 
Thus, in short, Hamilton rejected Brutus' argument regarding 
judicial supremacy by asserting, first of all, that the inherent 
weakness of the judiciary would ensure that it would not exercise 
a free-wheeling interpretation of the Constitution contrary to the 
wishes of Congress, and secondly, that the threat of impeach-
81. THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke cd., 1961). 
82. /d. 
83. /d. 
84. /d. 
85. /d. 
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ment would serve as "a complete security" against the danger of 
judicial aggrandizement of authority.86 
As noted earlier, Brutus had dismissed the threat of im-
peachment as an inhibiting factor against judicial supremacy. 
Nor is it necessary to refer to judicial history to demonstrate that 
all the other so-called "safeguards" adduced by Hamilton would 
be quite insufficient to restrain a judiciary bent on exercising ju-
dicial supremacy. Brutus had discounted in advance each of 
these so-called safeguards and had established quite clearly that, 
if the judges wished, the road to judicial supremacy was wide 
open to them. Hamilton's attempt, therefore, in Federalist Nos. 
78 and 81, to rebut Brutus' conclusions on the danger of judicial 
supremacy constituted, in the final analysis, an abject failure. 
Brutus' thesis represented, and represents, a powerful indict-
ment of the handiwork of the Framers, who unwittingly created 
one organ of government totally free of any checks and balances, 
despite the fact that this principle was supposed to be a mainstay 
of the republican system of government they were establishing. 
In the absence of any requirement of accountability, that organ 
of government was free to assert the right to "rule the roost" and 
exercise judicial supremacy. 
It is noteworthy that Madison recognized this fact only be-
latedly, when the Constitution was already ratified and about to 
be implemented.87 At the Constitutional Convention, Madison 
86. It is interesting to observe that Publius did not refer to the power of Congress 
under Article 3 of the Constitution to define the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court, "with such exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make," 
as a means of preventing judicial abuse of the power of judicial review. See Brutus' dis-
missal of such an argument in 2 STORING, supra note 6, at 2.9.176. Hamilton does refer to 
this provision at the end of Federalist No. 81, in answer to the charge that the Supreme 
Court would be empowered to revise jury determinations of fact. Perhaps he regarded 
congressional authority under the provision to define the scope of appellate jurisdiction 
as referring strictly to procedural, not substantive, matters. This issue, of course, arose 
directly in the Reconstruction case of Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (1 Wall.) 506 (1868). 
87. It is not clear that Madison saw Brutus' comments on the subject of judicial su-
premacy, or that they stimulated his thoughts on the subject. However, a personal letter 
to him by Alexander White, dated August 16, 1788, two months before his Observations 
on Jefferson's Draft, may have alerted him to the implications. ROBERT A. RUTLAND ET 
AL., THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 11:233 (1977). White was reacting to a protest by 
the judges of the Virginia Court of Appeals against the new district court law, on the 
ground that it might be said to conflict with the Virginia constitution. He objected to the 
judges' assumption that "the Constitution is paramount (to] the Ordinary Legislature." 
Id. "It is possible," he wrote, "that wise and good men may differ in the construction of 
some parts of it." /d. 
The Assembly may pass an Act which they conceive perfectly consistent with 
the Constitution, the Judges may determine it inconsistent. Who is to decide the 
Contest? If the Judges opinion is to prevail, it places them above the Law, es-
tablishes an Oligarchy, vests absolute power in 15 men who hold their places 
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had proposed that the national legislature serve as the umpire of 
the federal system. He advocated arming that body with a veto 
over all state legislation.88 Initially, the Convention accepted his 
proposal for a congressional veto over unconstitutional state leg-
islation. With Congress acting as a constitutional court, the road 
to judicial review and supremacy would appear to have been 
largely foreclosed. Subsequently, however, the Convention re-
jected Madison's legislative veto entirely, and implicitly made 
the judiciary the umpire of the federal system.89 This opened the 
door to judicial review of federal legislation generally, and 
hence, judicial supremacy. Madison was chagrined at the refusal 
of the Convention to adopt his legislative veto proposal.90 His 
dismay over the prospect of judicial supremacy is reflected in his 
1788 Observations on Jefferson's Draft Constitution for Vir-
ginia, in which he wrote as follows: 91 
In the State Constitutions & indeed in the Fed!. one also, no 
provision is made for the case of a disagreement in expound-
ing them; and as the Courts are generally the last in making 
their decision, it results to them, by refusing or not refusing to 
execute a law, to stamp it with its final character. This makes 
during life, and over whom the People have no controul. Much safer may it be 
left to the Assembly-they are the immediate representatives of the People, 
and should they pass an Act inconsistent with the principles of the Constitution 
in the oppinion of the Community at large, the Members concurring in the Act 
would be displaced at the next election, and evil removed in the course of a 
year .... It is their duty to expound the Laws and to give Judgement according 
to their true sense and meaning-but that they should have a right to execute or 
not to execute at their Will and Pleast.re a clear express Statute, is I believe a 
novelty in Politicks, the consequences of which may not be easily foreseen. 
ld. at 11:233. 
88. See Charles F. Hobson, The Negative on State Laws: James Madison, the Consti-
tution, and the Crisis of Republican Government, 36 WM. & MARY Q. 215 (1979). This 
article is one of the most important pieces to appear on the founding. 
89. See SLONIM, supra note 79, at 256. 
90. In a lengthy letter to Jefferson on October 24, 1787, Madison expressed the fear 
that the Constitution would be a failure. See id. at 116-17. 
91. Papers of lames Madison, 11:293. For a discussion of Madison's views on judi-
cial review, see Ralph Ketcham, James Madison and Judicial Review, 8 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 158 (1956-57), and Editorial Comment in 11 PJM 284-85. 
Significantly, even after the passage of some thirty years, Madison was still not rec-
onciled to judicial review of federal legislation. In a letter to President James Monroe in 
1817, he recalled "the attempts in the Convention to vest in the Judiciary Department a 
qualified negative on Legislative bills." Such a control, restricted to Constitutional points, 
besides giving greater stability and system to the rules of expounding the Instrument, 
"would have precluded the question of a judiciary annulment of Legislative acts." Letters 
and other Writings of lames Madison, vol. 3, p. 56 (N.Y.: Worthington, 1884) (cited by 
THORNTON ANDERSON, CREATING THE CO:->STITUTIO!\' 141 n.22 (1993)). 
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the Judiciary Dept paramount in fact to the Legislature, 
which was never intended, and can never be proper.92 
He proposed that in each of these governments, after an in-
tervening election, a super-majority of both houses of the legisla-
ture (two-thirds or three-fourths) be qualified to override an ex-
ecutive or judicial veto. "It sd. not be allowed the Judges or the 
Ex [ecutive] to pronounce a law thus enacted, unconstitul. & in-
valid," declared Madison. In the words of one prominent writer: 
"Madison's cardinal tenet was that unchecked power in human 
hands was liable to abuse, and hence [that) that government was 
'least imperfect' which kept a check on all exercise of power and 
authority."93 In relation to the Court, Madison, of course, never 
pursued this thought and nothing came of his proposal for reign-
ing in the judiciary. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Federalist No. 78, which appeared even before the Constitu-
tion was ratified and entered into force, is well known as an early 
exposition of, and justification for, judicial review. What is less 
well known is that this essay by Hamilton represented a rejoin-
der to the contention of the Antifederalist essayist Brutus that 
the Constitution furnished the basis, not only for judicial review, 
but also for judicial supremacy. Sound government, Brutus had 
written, required that the three branches of government be both 
separated and accountable. Yet the Constitution, while it pro-
vided for checks and balances in relation to the legislature and 
executive, imposed no restraints on the Supreme Court. Once 
the tribunal was seized of a case, it would be free to rule as it 
chose and was accountable to no outside source. Since its voice 
would be the last pronouncement in the process of legislation, its 
92. Strangely enough, this comment did not prevent Madison some six months 
later, on June 8, 1789, from suggesting that the judiciary would act as a guardian of a bill 
of rights. In presenting a draft list of amendments to Congress, he said: 
If they are incorporated into the Constitution, independent tribunals of justice 
will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights, they 
will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legis-
lative or executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon 
rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of rights. 
Papers of James Madison, 12:206--D7. 
The seeming contradiction might be cleared up if one assumes that Madison was re-
ferring here to the state level only. Alternatively, perhaps he accepted a role for the 
courts in protecting rights, but not in determining the scope of federal power in national-
state affairs. 
93. Ketcham, supra note 91, at 158. 
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ruling would effectively bind the other two branches. Govern-
ment policy would thus be largely determined by an unelected 
body. Hamilton's attempt to deny Brutus's charge that the Con-
stitution gave license to judicial supremacy is seen, upon analy-
sis, to be quite unpersuasive. James Madison, Father of the Con-
stitution, belatedly came to realize, and regret, the manner in 
which an unfettered court could exercise domination over the 
other two branches of the federal government. Under Madison's 
original constitutional scheme, the national legislature would 
serve as the umpire of the federal system, and the court's role 
would have been restricted. There would thus have been little 
room for judicial review of federal legislation, much less for judi-
cial supremacy. But the Convention rejected his proposal for a 
legislative veto over state legislation, and, as a result, the court 
was ensconced as the umpire of the federal system. Therewith, 
judicial review, and with it, judicial supremacy, were-
unwittingly perhaps-instituted under the U.S. Constitution. 
